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FACTORS AFFECTING THE PLEA-BARGAINING PROCESS IN
ERIE COUNTY: SOME TENTATIVE FINDINGS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the legitimacy and necessity of plea bargaining rest
on a variety of philosophical and practical considerations,1 the
basic rationale is that plea bargaining not only saves time and ex-
pense for the state and the accused, but also eliminates the uncer-
tainty both would experience at trial.2 The conventional tradeoff
is a plea of guilty in return for a charge reduction, perhaps accom-
panied by a recommendation of sentence leniency by the prose-
cutor.' Despite existing differences of opinion concerning the
adequacy of various rationales for the plea process, the literature is
replete with demands for the formulation of standards to be applied
in the plea bargaining process. The hope is that the product of
well-defined standards will be a reduction in inconsistent determi-
nations. If the process were more visible and subject to more con-
trol, it is argued, then a minimization of corruption and unfairness
would result.4 The literature also evidences a countervailing desire
for the flexibility that prosecutorial decisionmaking (in the form
of plea bargaining) affords.5 Judge Breitel has summarized the
* This research was conducted under a grant from the National Institute of Mental
Health, under the auspices of the Criminal Justice Specialists Program at the State Univer-
sity of New York at Buffalo, Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence. Special appreciation is
extended to Richard D. Schwartz, Ph.D., and Carl Hosticka, Ph.D., for their assistance and
guidance.
1. The United States Supreme Court has at various times enunciated its attitude with
regard to the plea bargaining process. In Santobello v. New York, for example, the Supreme
Court spoke of plea bargains as a desirable means to the ends of prompt and final dis-
position of criminal cases, protection of the public from accused individuals who have
been released on bail, and enhancement of the rehabilitative process by means of rapid
disposition and sentencing. 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971). Since, however, all these noble
aspirations presuppose an element of fairness in the bargaining process, the court may, in
the exercise of its discretion, reject the bargained plea if the prosecutor does not fulfill
his promises. Id. at 261-62.
2. Newman, Reshape the Deal, 9 TRIAL 11 (May-June 1973).
3. Id. at 11. The American Bar Association has sanctioned sentence concessions as
well as charge reductions. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY 2 (1967) [here-
inafter cited as ABA STANDARDS].
4. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 62-63.
5. Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19
U.C.L.A. L. Rlv. 1, 3 (1971).
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general concerns: "The question then is not how to eliminate or
reduce discretion, but how to control it so as to avoid the unequal,
the arbitrary, the discriminatory, and the oppressive."6
Traditionally, the duty of every district attorney has been to
"conduct all prosecutions for crimes and offenses cognizable by the
courts of the county for which he shall have been elected or ap-
pointed."'7 By necessary implication, the district attorney's author-
ity to prosecute crimes has been deemed to include the authority
to recommend acceptance of a plea of guilty to a lesser included
offense.8 The court is then empowered to accept or reject the rec-
ommended plea.9
Legislative and judicial attempts have been made to define the
prosecutor's power to plea bargain, and to insure that the bargain-
ing process takes place with due regard for constitutional mandates
of due process. However, the delicate balance between system-
oriented efficiency and standards to ensure that defendants are
dealt with justly is not easily achieved.
The concept of standardization is an admirable goal if two
criteria are met. First, the standards must be logically related to the
elimination of what is deemed to be a possible, or actual, abuse of
the system, and second, the standards must be implemented in the
actual processing of cases. Satisfaction of the first criterion is a task
best left to policymakers, and is not examined here. What this arti-
cle does examine is the extent to which articulated standards are
translated into behavior.
In order to determine the relationship between what "should
be" and "what is," and thus to indicate to policymakers the need
for increased accountability in the plea bargaining process, field
research was conducted in the Erie County District Attorney's
Office. The fundamental question was: what relation do the cri-
teria proposed for the operation of the system10 have to the way plea
bargaining is actually conducted?
The field study indicated that some surprising factors affect
the plea bargaining process (e.g., whether a public or private de-
fense attorney handles the case), that district attorneys with "plea
6. Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. Ci. L. RFv. 427 (1960).
7. Naw YoRK CouNTY LAWy § 700-01 (McKinney 1972).
8. McDonald v. Sobel, 272 App. Div. 455, 72 N.Y.S.2d 4, afJ'd, 297 N.Y. 679, 77
N.E.2d 3 (1947).
9. N.Y. CRim. PRoc. LAW § 220.10 (3) (McKinney 1976).
10. The Erie County Bar Association's position and the Buffalo Police Department
rules represent the way the plea bargaining process should operate in Erie County.
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authority" operate on the basis of rudimentary knowledge of a case,
and that pleas are approved subsequent to informal, undocumented
conversations with opposing counsel. Thus, it appears that the mere
articulation of local standards for plea bargaining procedures does
not insure implementation of the standards. What is needed, it is
argued, is a set of procedural safeguards for documentation and re-
view of the plea negotiation process.
II. STANDARDS IN ERIE COUNTY
The Erie County Bar Association has formally endorsed the
practice of plea bargaining.1 In justifying this stance, it has char-
acterized the plea bargain as an expeditor of rehabilitation as well
as an historically accepted means of obtaining "individualized"
justice. Relief from unnecessary expense and uncertainty was also
cited as an advantage of plea bargaining. 2
It should also be noted that while the Association generally
approved of plea bargaining, it did attempt to correct what it per-
ceived to be "misunderstandings" surrounding the process. For
example, the term "plea bargaining" is rather commercial in tone.
Therefore, the Association's formal statement suggested adoption
of the term "plea agreement."' 3 This suggestion seems anomalous,
however, in a locality in which the participants and observers refer
to the process as "Let's Make a Deal."' 4
The Erie County Bar Association also provides guidelines for
judicial and police participation in the process. In the Association's
view, justice is best served, when the judiciary and the district attor-
11. H. Brand, V. Doyle & J. McCarthy, The Plea Agreement: A Position Paper of the
Erie County Bar Association (April 7, 1975). Joseph McCarthy is First Assistant to the
District Attorney of Erie County. This paper was represented to me as generally indicative
of that office's policy concerning plea agreements. The first assistant also informed me of
a "plea authorization slip" formulated by him, for use by his assistants. After obtaining a
copy of this (with some difficulty) I questioned various assistants'about the meaning of
the listed concerns of a district attorney in making a plea agreement. They were unable
to explain many of the terms, however, and admitted failure to use the slip, although
they stated that they applied some of the same considerations in various cases. Interview
with Joseph McCarthy, Buffalo, New York (June 25, 1975); discussion with assistants
(July 8, 10, and 29, 1975).
12. H. Brand, V. Doyle, & J. McCarthy, supra note 11, at 2. These justifications for
plea agreements are similar to those articulated by the Supreme Court in Santobello v.
New York, 404 U.S. at 261.
13. H. Brand, V. Doyle, & J. McCarthy, supra note 11, at 1.
14. Police officers and attorneys involved in the plea bargaining process used this
phrase to describe plea bargaining several times during the period of this study.
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neys "act independently" of each other. The judge, therefore,
should refrain from encouraging or discouraging the plea, and the
prosecutor should refrain from intruding on the judicial function
of sentencing except in "extraordinary situations."'" The police
officer, in some cases, may be both the victim and the arresting offi-
cer. Thus, the Association maintains, his position, or that of any
victim of a crime, should be heard by the district attorney before
any plea is approved, but his "desires in the matter should not
control." Rather, the officer's opinion should be "one factor to be
considered by the prosecutor in either consenting or refusing to
consent to a plea."'16 Furthermore, the Buffalo Police Department
regulations mandate that an officer shall not "recommend, approve,
nor actively consent to, the reduction or changing of a charge
against a prisoner. '17 When asked his opinion of a reduced plea,
the officer's response must be that "he cannot participate in a 'plea
bargaining' and to do so would be a violation of departmental
rules.""
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Data was collected two ways: (1) direct observation of the plea
negotiation process, and (2) interviews. Background interviews
were conducted with policymakers in the Erie County District At-
torney's Office, the Buffalo Police Department, the Erie County
15. H. Brand, V. Doyle & J. McCarthy, supra note 11, at 3-4. This is contrary to the
view of the Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference of the State of New York that
judges should encourage discussions between an informed prosecuting attorney and an
informed defense counsel. Memorandum from the Administrative Board to all trial judges
(Jan. 10, 1973), cited in H. Brand, V. Doyle 8. J. McCarthy, supra note 11, at 4.
16. H. Brand, V. Doyle & J. McCarthy, supra note 11, at 8.
17. Buffalo Police Department, Police Academy Training Bulletin, Rule 4.7.9 (Feb.,
1973).
18. Id. Such articulation of standards for prosecuting attorneys, judges and police
officers is apparently aimed at maintaining the consistent and uniform objectivity exer-
cised by courts and prosecutors as opposed to the contamination which would result were
influence to be exerted by subjective individual victims. Certainly, the standards advocat-
ing separation of prosecutorial, judicial, and police functons do not seek to cure all the
possible ills of the plea bargaining process, but they are nevertheless valuable if they do
indeed relate to elimination of abuse or unfairness. The philosophical foundation of the
rules is that the prosecutor, rather than the judge or the police officer, is best equipped
to assess the legal, factual, and practical aspects of the case, and to "fit" the "crime" to
the defendant through plea bargaining, free from emotional interference of the experi-
ences of the victim or police officer; the judge is the appropriate party to determine the
defendant's specific rehabilitative needs by means of a pre-sentence report and a knowledge
of the resources available to the court.
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Sheriff's Department, and the Public Defender's Office. 19 Inter-
views were conducted with open-ended questions, specifically de-
signed not to suggest any expected answers."
After obtaining adequate consent,2 88 plea-negotiation ses-
sions were observed over a three week period.2 2 No cases were sys-
tematically excluded, but if several cases were being discussed
simultaneously, only one was recorded. 8 The data gathered con-
sisted of a record of the conversation that took place among the
district attorney, the defense attorney, and other individuals pres-
ent,24 and any other information which could be obtained in a very
brief, unstructured, post-negotiation discussion with the district
attorney.
IV. GENERAL FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS
A. The Plea Negotiation Process
The City Court Bureau disposes of thousands of cases each
year through plea bargaining.2 5 A typical bargaining session lasts
between five and ten minutes, 2 and consists of the district attorney
and the defense attorney exchanging offers. If the parties are not
mutually satisfied with the initial offer, they may either make
counter-offers or suggest practical reasons for accepting a particular
plea agreement. For example, the defense attorney may mention
the inadequacy of proof or the fact that the defendant will prob-
19. These interviewees were chosen because their roles provide them with authority
to set up policy standards for the operation of their departments, and with the authority
to allow the researcher to interview the assistant district attorneys and police officers who
implement the standards.
20. The questions are reprinted in the addenda on pages 710 to 711, infra.
21. Permission was obtained from the defense attorney in each case observed.
22. The observation period was July 14, 1975 through August 1, 1975. This period
coincided with the typical summer vacation period, perhaps making the sample of cases
and participants in the plea negotiation sessions not entirely typical of the rest of the year.
23. The researcher attempted to document the discussions, but this was not always
possible given the informal, unscheduled, and often simultaneous nature of the discussions.
24. These may include the defendant, the victim, the police officer, or the victim's
family.
25. In 1974, for example, approximately 8,000 of 17,000 case dispositions were arrived
at through plea bargaining. City Court of Buffalo, Annual Report 2 (1974).
26. The District Attorney has been quoted as saying that every case is "subjected to
close scrutiny" and that the assistant district attorneys "look very closely before an agree-
ment is made." Healy, DA's Differ on Plea Bargaining as Criminal Justice Tool, Buffalo




ably get only probation even if he is convicted as charged.2 7 If all
else fails, one party resorts to threatening the other with going to
trial.2 On one occasion, the district attorney did not acquiesce to
an eventual plea simply because he felt that he had to present a
stern "front" or risk the loss of his reputation as a tough nego-
tiator.2 9
Other active parties in the discussion typically include the
police officer and/or the victim. The dynamic between the prose-
cutor and the police officer represents one primary area of inter-
pretation by the researcher. In 75% of the instances in which the
police officer or victim was present at the negotiation either he was
addressed directly by the district attorney or else his "voluntary"
statements were acknowledged. If the district attorney's question
resembled a request for an approval or disapproval of a particular
plea bargain, the police officer would reply that he could not offer
his opinion. The district attorney, however, had various methods
of eliciting an opinion about the case from the officer. In some in-
stances the district attorney would rephrase his question so as to
request the officer's "professional opinion" as to whether this de-
fendant had "learned his lesson." 30 Other times the district attorney
gave the officer an opportunity to describe the defendant's activities
at the time of the arrest more "fully" than he had in the informa-
tion,31 or asked the officer if the defendant had given him a "bad
time." 32
The district attorney's elicitation of approval or disapproval
from the victim was much less vague. This more direct approach
probably results from the fact that while the victim's view cannot
be "controlling," 33 there are no rules which specifically prohibit
consulting the victim in this regard. There was no case in which
the result of the plea bargain was contrary to either the view of the
police officer or that of the victim (as inferred by the researcher),
unless the district attorney lacked the power to implement the re-
27. Plea negotiations observed: July 22, 23, 31, 1975 and Aug. 1, 1975 (five occasions).
28. Plea negotiations observed: July 24 and 28, 1975 (three occasions).
29. Plea negotiation observed: July 24, 1975.
30. Plea negotiations observed: July 18 and 24, 1975 (five occasions).
31. Plea negotiations observed: July 15 and 31, 1975 and Aug. 1, 1975 (six occasions).
32. Plea negotiations observed: July 23, 24, 28 and 31, 1975 and Aug. 1, 1975 (ten
occasions).
33. H. Brand, V. Doyle & J. McCarthy, supra note 11, at 8.
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quest.84 While such a result may be coincidental, it does suggest
that the opinions of the officer and the victim are factors which are
considered by the district attorney. To buttress this conclusion,
there were cases in which police officers walked into the office,
prepared the plea agreement slips, and placed them in front of the
district attorney for his signature.3 5 Also, in certain instances, the
district attorney asked a detective from a particular squad to sug-
gest a plea. Because of this officer's position, his suggestion was
routinely controlling. 0
B. Interviews
Seven law enforcement officers were interviewed. When asked
to express their thoughts on the considerations of the prosecutor,
they uniformly stated that the prosecutor himself should be asked
this question. The reasons given for this response were that only
the district attorney has the authority to negotiate pleas and that
policemen are not qualified to answer "legal" questions. The re-
searcher was referred to the police regulations which apparently
were supposed to represent current practices; if they did not, no
one was going to acknowledge the discrepancy. Thus, the inter-
view phase revealed that police officers and members of the district
attorney's staff, when asked about the plea bargaining process,
would make reference to the articulated standards as the source of
all behavior.
V. STATISTICAL ANALYSES
Because research was limited to the City Court Bureau of the
Erie County District Attorney's Office, the only plea bargains un-
der consideration are charge reductions from felony level to mis-
demeanor level, or reductions within the misdemeanor range or to
34. For example, the district attorney cannot revoke a defendant's taxi registration
simply because the police officer suspects that the taxi was used in bank robberies, and a
district attorney in city court bureau cannot accept a guilty plea to a felony. Plea negotia-
tions observed: July 16 and 23, 1975 (two occasions).
35. Plea negotiations observed: July 22 and 28, 1975 (four occasions).
36. Plea negotiations observed: July 24 and 28, 1975. This officer's opinion was con-
trolling when a particular crime was involved. The reason for this officer's special au-
thority could be because of his reputation in the law enforcement community, or because




violation level. An overview of the charge reduction data illustrates
that 48% of the cases were disposed of by a reduction to two
"steps" below the original charge. (Table A.) (All computations
have been rounded to whole numbers.) That is, a reduction from
a D felony to an E felony would be one step, as would a reduction
from E felony to A misdemeanor. No distinction has been made
between the degree of severity between the E felony/A misde-
meanor step and the A misdemeanor/B misdemeanor step. Rather,
the steps are presumed to constitute a form of ordinal measurement.
TABLE A
Overview of Case Dispositions
Guilty plea Percent of cases observed
To charge 1%
1 step charge reduction 24%
2 step charge reduction 48%
3 step charge reduction 9%
4 step charge reduction 2%
trial 10%
adjournment 6%
Statistical analyses were performed to measure the relationship
between each of the following four variables and the resulting plea
bargain: (1) the particular district attorney authorizing the plea,
(2) the presence of the police officer at the plea discussion, (3) the
presence of the victim of the crime at the plea discussion, and (4)
whether or not the defense attorney handling the case was a public
defender. The following description of findings focuses on the po-
tential source of influence, its actual effect on the plea, and the
degree of that effect.
A. The Identity of the District Attorney37
In only 10 of the 88 cases did the two district attorneys express
independent opinions concerning the plea recommendations. In
37. One district attorney handled 82% of the plea negotiations observed. The other
district attorneys (in city court bureau) with "plea authority" handled 18% of the cases
observed. There is no specific assignment of plea negotiations to the district attorneys.
The process is random, except that one district attorney spends a greater proportion of
his time on plea negotiations than the other district attorneys. In Table B, supra page 701,
this individual is identified as the "primary plea negotiator." The two other district at-
torneys are referred to as the "secondary plea negotiators."
[Vol. 26
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three such cases the district attorneys formulated inconsistent deci-
sions concerning the same set of facts. (Table B.) Although ten
cases is a very small sample, the large proportion (30%) of incon-




Number of Percent of
cases (out cases (out
of 88 of 88
observed) observed)
District attorney with plea authority:
primary negotiator 72 82%
secondary negotiators 16 18%
Parties present at plea discussion:
defendant 6 7%
victim (non-police) 28 32%
police officer 52 59%
Defense attorney:
none present 10 11%
public defender 59 67%
private attorney 19 22%
Disposition of case coincides with view of victim: 24 out of the 28
cases at which the victim was present (86%).
Disposition of case coincides with view of police officer: 48 out of
the 52 cases at which the officer was present (92%).
District attorney makes sentence recommendation on plea authori-
zation slip: 4 out of 88 cases observed (50%).
Judge makes recommendation concerning plea: 2 out of 88 cases
observed (2%).
District attorney asks private defense attorney if he has been paid
yet: 2 out of 19 privately defended cases (11%).
District attorneys' conflicting opinions exhibited concerning plea in
the same case: 3 out of 10 cases in which two opinions were
rendered (30%).
A comparison was made between plea decisions of the primary
negotiator, so named because he handled 82% of the negotiations
observed, and those of the two other district attorneys with plea
authority (secondary negotiators.) Viewing the overall distribution
1977]
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of cases over the categories of disposition, it appears that the two
secondary negotiators were much more lenient than the primary
negotiator as evidenced by their authorization of a greater propor-
tion of 2, 3, and 4 step charge reductions. (Table C-1.) When "plea
strength" was measured, however, that is, when trials and adjourn-
ments were disregarded, guilty pleas considered, and t-scores38
computed, the apparent differences were found to be statistically
not significant.89 (Table C-2.)
Despite the lack of statistical significance, the percentages re-
main as indicators of possible sources of inconsistency in the plea
process. The possibility of different district attorneys within the
same office arriving at contradictory plea decisions should be fur-
ther examined with a larger sample-this would allow a more con-
fident statement of the results.


























































t = - 1.229358 (not significant)
38. T-scores were computed on the basis of a = -,. For an explanation of statistical
methodology see H. BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS at 226 (1972).
59. The fact that the secondary negotiators were observed so seldom might account
for the lack of any finding of statistical significance.
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B. Presence of Police Officer
The arresting officer" was often present either to act as a wit-
ness when the defendant was scheduled for trial on that day, or to
provide the district attorney with information concerning the case
on the day of arraignment. The officer was classified as "present"
at the plea discussion regardless of whether he voluntarily gave the
district attorney information, answered the district attorney's ques-
tions, or merely stood mute. Under this system, the police officer
was present at 59% of the plea discussions, and his view of the case
coincided with the final disposition of the case in 92% of those
discussions. (Table B.) The officer's view was exhibited in numer-
ous ways: his eagerness to dispose of the case in whatever manner
so that he could go home as quickly as was possible, his willingness
to testify at trial that day, his apathy, or his desire to dispose of the
case with a specific plea because that is what he felt the defendant
deserved. Therefore, this analysis presupposes matching interpre-
tations of the officer's attitude by the prosecutor and the researcher.
In spite of the subjective nature of the process, however, the dis-
trict attorney's solicitation of attitudinal responses from the officers
was relatively obvious and represents a factor which must have
affected his decisionmaking process to some extent.
A comparison was made of case dispositions with the officer
present and the officer absent. (Table D-1.) The percentage distri-
bution over the categories of disposition is not noteworthy, except
that when the police officer was absent, there were more cases sched-
uled for trial. A possible explanation for this is the district attor-
ney's reluctance to accept a plea without first speaking to the
arresting officer. If the case is scheduled for trial, there will be time
to contact the officer to obtain further information from him, and a
plea can still be authorized prior to trial. A statistical analysis of
"plea strength"4' 1 indicates that the reductions to the charges against
the defendants were not significantly affected by the presence or
absence of the arresting officer. (Table D-2.)
40. The arresting officer may have been a member of a public police force, such as
the city or county patrol or investigative units, or a private or specialized police force,
such as store detectives or campus police.
41. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
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t = .0088058 (not significant)
C. Presence of Victim
The victim was present at 32% of the plea discussions ob-
served, and his view coincided with the final disposition of the case
in 86% of those discussions. (Table B.) The case more often went
to trial when the victim was present at the plea bargaining discus-
sion (Table E-l), probably because the victim was prepared to go
TABLE E-1
Number of steps by Victim present Victim absent
which charge reduced Number/Percent of cases Number/Percent of cases
0 0 0% 1 2%
1 5 18% 15 25%
2 14 50% 81 52%
3 4 14% 8 5%
4 0 0% 2 3%
trial 5 18% 3 5%




to court that day and did not object to spending more time if jus-
tice would be served by the sacrifice. However, the t-test comparing
differences between the frequencies of various pleas with the victim
present or absent yielded no significant results. (Table E-2.)
TABLE E-2




























t = .7196219 (not significant)
D. Private Defense Attorney Compared with Public Defender
Private defense attorneys handled only 22% of the cases ob-
served. (Table B.) The distribution of private defender/public
defender case dispositions indicates noticeable percentage differ-
ences. Private defense attorneys obtained considerably "better"
plea bargains than did public defenders. Twenty-seven percent of
the private attorneys' cases resulted in a plea to a charge reduced
3 or 4 steps below the original charge, as compared with only 5%
of the public defender's cases in the same category. (Table F-1.)
TABLE F-1
Number of steps by
which charge reduced
Private attorney Public defender
Number/Percent of cases Number/Percent of cases
0 0 0% 1 2%
1 3 16% 16 27%
2 8 42% 25 42%
3 3 16% 3 5%
4 2 11% 0 0%
trial 0 0% 11 19%
adjournment 3 16% 3 5%
N=19 N=59
The distribution of pleas over the five categories of charge reduc-
tion varied enough between the private and public defenders to
justify a conclusion that, in general, private attorneys are more
1977]
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successful than public defenders in obtaining more "desirable"
bargains for their clients.42
In addition, private attorneys in the sample never went to trial,
and frequently had their cases adjourned, whereas the opposite
situation existed for public defenders. This seems anomalous since
it is only the private attorney who is compensated commensurate
with the time he spends in court. The public defender works on a
salary rather than for a fee contingent on the number of hours he
devotes to a case.43 The high percentage of publicly defended cases
going to trial might, however, be attributable to the fact that many
of the observed plea discussions took place on the day of arraign-
ment. Therefore, cases subsequently set down for trial could still
have been disposed of by guilty plea between the arraignment and
the trial date if the public defender persuaded his client to accept
the district attorney's offer, or if the district attorney revised his
offer, making it more acceptable to the public defender.
TABLE F-2
Plea Strength
Number of steps by Private attorney Public defender
which charge reduced Number/Percent of cases Number/Percent of cases
o 0 0% 1 2%
1 3 19% 16 36%
2 8 50% 25 56%
3 3 19% 3 7%
4 2 13% 0 0%
N=16 N=45
X = 2.25 X = 1.66666
= .9013878 a= .6324555
t = 2.1376746 (significant at .05 level)
The inability of the public defender to strike a bargain roughly
equivalent to what a private attorney would obtain may be the
result of several factors: (1) public defenders may not have the
resources, in the form of time and personnel, to investigate their
cases adequately and to identify enough legal and factual "weak-
nesses" to persuade the prosecutor to authorize a particular plea,
(2) the sense of "adversariness" necessary for competitive bargain-
42. The t-score was 2.1376746, indicating that there is a 95% probability that the
difference in distributions was caused by the variable measured rather than by chance.
43. Interview with Richard Boccio, Director of Legal Aid Bureau of Buffalo, Criminal
Division, in Buffalo, New York (May 19, 1976).
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ing may be lacking between the district attorney and public de-
fender, because of their very frequent dealings with each other and
the close proximity of their offices in the city court building, (3)
the public defenders' caseload may be so large that the pressure to
dispose of cases quickly outweighs the desire to obtain a drastic
reduction for a client, and (4) the "class" of defendants represented
by the public defender's office may consist of the more frequent
offenders who might be "presumed" guilty, thus placing the public
defender in an unfavorable bargaining position.44
RECOMMENDATIONS
Various desirable objectives concerning the operation of the
plea bargaining system include: formulation of standards that are
rationally related to the goals of informed plea bargaining and
humanization of the plea bargaining process; authorization of
pleas with assurance that similarly situated defendants receive con-
sistently fair and equal treatment; and reallocation of personnel
and financial resources with a recognition of the significance of the
plea bargaining process . The perplexing problem is the order and
interrelationship of these priorities.
Even if rational standards are delineated by a bar association,
the police department, or the prosecutor's office, given the appar-
ent influence of the district attorneys' subjective impressions,46 it
might be necessary to translate such standards into specific office
procedures designed to cull from the decisionmaking process a
written, reviewable record. The "plea authorization slip" recom-
mended by the First Assistant to the District Attorney of Erie
County, but seldom used in practice,47 might well be sufficient to
provide adequate documentation to serve as the basis for a review
procedure to be undertaken by the district attorney's staff.
In addition, review of the factors which determine a district
attorney's decision to authorize a plea bargain by the judiciary, the
police force, and the community at large would facilitate constant
44. Id. The fact that the public defender's office serves a large proportion of re-
peated offenders was documented by Mr. Boccio.
45. See generally ABA STANDARs, supra note 3; Abrams, supra note 5; Breitel, supra
note 6.
46. See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
47. The plea authorization slip is discussed in note 11 supra.
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scrutiny of the plea bargaining process by all groups that have an
interest in it. A random sample of all cases disposed of by guilty
plea should be reviewed. This investigation should include an
analysis of the uniformity of criteria that affect each prosecutor's
decisions. An examination of the various relationships which were
the subject of this study might provide a current check on all par-
ties interacting in the bargaining system. Since the public is directly
affected by any disposition of a criminal case, the role of the "com-
munity" component should be more than that of observer. Rather,
the lay members of the review board should provide an active rep-
resentation of all citizens.
Locally prescribed standards for plea negotiation can be ap-
plied only if the attorneys involved are completely familiar with the
case at hand. In other words, an intelligent bargain, suited to the
needs of a particular defendant, can be struck only if the defen-
dant's background, and the facts and law involved, have been
thoroughly examined and considered. Perhaps a less costly manner
of obtaining this extensive information is through the use of in-
vestigators, such as law students or paralegals who could gather
data and compile it in systematic fashion to be interpreted by the
prosecutor or public defender. Such a compilation, similar to the
pre-sentence report used by judges, would make possible an assess-
ment of the needs of a particular defendant. An appropriate class
of sanctions could then be imposed through a plea of guilty to a
reduced charge.
The familiarity of the attorney with a defendant and his case
could be furthered by assignment of attorneys to follow a case from
arraignment through to acquittal or sentencing. In this way, the
defendant would become more than a series of files passing over
desks, and an attorney could more easily develop a sense of respon-
sibility for the individual's fate. Because only the prosecutor who
has investigated and studied a case has a full appreciation of its
legal status and the position of the defendant, each district attorney
should be given authority to negotiate pleas. This procedure would
reduce the assembly line quality of the plea bargaining process
which results when the few district attorneys with plea authority
dispose of ten or fifteen cases in an hour. One possible reason for
delegating plea authority to a few selected assistants is that it in-
sures the uniformity of the process. This purpose might be equally
served by a requirement of a written delineation of the reasons for
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a plea bargain and an articulated standard review of these reasons.
Above all, the defendant must be recognized and acknowl-
edged as a human being and a member of society. Such recognition
requires dealing with the characteristics and needs of the accused
in a way not possible with the assembly line approach now taken




Questions asked of law enforcement officers during interview phase:
1. After making an arrest, what information do you put in the formal
written police report? What is this report called?
2. How do you make the first contact with the prosecutor's office regard-
ing an arrest you have made? Who makes the contact? When is it made?
3. Who prepares the accusatory instrument which is given to the court and
the accused at arraignment? How does it differ from the police report?
4. Who received copies of the police report? Is the report sent to the prose-
cutor's office?
5. When a police file is sent to the prosecutor's office, who makes the de-
cision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to make?
6. What factors do you think, in practice, go into the decision whether or
not to prosecute, and what charge to make?
7. What set of circumstances might result in a decision not to prosecute?
8. What sources of information do you know of that the prosecutor uses
in making his decision whether or not to prosecute?
9. How are follow-up contacts made between the police and the prose-
cutor's office? What is discussed?
10. Do you make known to the prosecutor your opinions and recommen-
dations regarding a particular case? Do you think your recommendation
affects the prosecutor's decision making process?
11. In arrests initiated by citizen complaints, what do you think is the in-
fluence of the citizen's wishes on the prosecutor's decision?
12. Do you think there is consistency between the plea decisions of various
district attorneys with plea authority?





Questions asked of assistant district attorneys during interview phase:
1. After an arrest, how is contact made between the police and the prose-
cutor's office? When is it made?
2. Which assistant district attorneys are authorized to make plea bargains?
Does each assistant make all decisions for all cases assigned to him?
3. What factors go into the decision whether or not to prosecute?
4. What factors go into the decision to authorize a particular plea bar-
gain? Are these factors recorded? Is this decision reviewed by another
member of the district attorney's staff?
5. What sources of information are used in making the decision to autho-
rize a plea bargain?
6. Do you receive police opinion or recommendation about a particular
plea bargain?
7. In arrests initiated by citizen complaint, what is the influence of the
citizen's wishes on your decision regarding a plea bargain?
8. Is there consistency between the decisions of all district attorneys with
plea authority? Do they all apply the same criteria?
9. Does your office have a policy advocating plea bargaining in as many
cases as possible?
10. Can a defense attorney influence your decision whether or not to au-
thorize a plea bargain?
11. What is the role of the judge in the plea bargaining process?

